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Picking up some of the threads of the current debate on this blog, I would like
to focus on an aspect that to my mind is of crucial importance in the matter: the
necessity of translation.
What I mean by that will hopefully become clear in the course of the following three
steps:
First I would like to argue why and in what sense doctrinal scholarship is (or at
least can be) at the very core of law. In a second step I would like to explain why
– therefore and nevertheless – it needs interdisciplinarity and internationalization/
comparative legal studies. And finally I focus on one of the main conditions for a
successful dialogue between these elements. All this flanked by referring to the
report of the German Council of Science and Humanities and how it faces these
three aspects.
I start – not surprisingly – with the first step:  the value of legal doctrine
Legal doctrine is a mediator of will, it communicates normativity by being an
interpreter between the abstract general norm(s) and the concrete particular case(s)
with a – cum grano salis – clear and precise grammar (see also report p. 37) –
and I would hold this even though I am well aware of its limits. By doing so, legal
doctrine is also the common language in a dialog of legal science and legal practice,
making the (smaller or larger) space of scientific reasoning more easily accessible
to application and vice versa. Thus it also enriches the concept of equality of and
before the law relating universal and general aspects of equal treatment to the
diversities of every singular case/subject. Legal doctrine in so far also resembles the
very idea of normativity as a link between mind and the world experienced, between
an idea or will and its realization. “Its objects are legal texts that are both valid and
intended to be applied” (report p. 35). The “normativity and decision-making function
of legal scholarship” “has real and lasting effects on social life.” (report p. 32). Of
course, this is true for all legal systems. Yet the conclusion that the German tradition
draws from this is I think to a certain extent specific: “Only a methodically sound,
consistent and coherent law adhering to justifiable principles can be applied by
courts, administrative institutions, legal consultants and others.” (report p. 37). “The
insights gained are brought together in a structured way and developed further in
the doctrinal subjects, employing reasoning that must be internally consistent and
coherent with other scholarly insights.” (report p. 33). So the German focus is on
“the legal system in its entirety” (report p. 36) with the intention that the discipline
as well as the legal system itself “remains unified” (report ibid.). I don’t mean to say
that other legal traditions are unsystematic, I just think that Germans are inclined
to a specific and strong idea demanding logical systems, which probably goes
back to the German tradition of systematic philosophy (see for example Kant’s
concept of the “architecture of reason” in the Critique of Pure Reason p. A 832/
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B 860 as well as his idea of philosophy in general). As for German legal doctrine
in particular I suppose (but I am not an expert in this) that it also originated from
the Roman law tradition of German private law with influences by the so-called
“Begriffsjurisprudenz”. Anyway it is a cultural development (as Ralf Michaels’ subtly
differentiated post put it) not in the sense of an innate Volksgeist but rather in the
sense of a tradition of ideas. This need neither stay exclusively German nor is it
the solution to the world’s legal problems or the winning concept in a competition
for the best legal system. There are simply several differences to the logic of case
law systems for example, which also become visible in the report, e.g. on p. 41:
legal practice should not (by primarily relying on and relating to precedents) become
a self- referential system in the sense that it no longer draws on the systematic,
reflecting, organizing and critical sources of legal science, but that on the contrary
the strongly integrative approach as well as the systematic entirety should be
maintained. One may consider this system-fixation an obstacle to the freedom of
legal reasoning – I personally rather think it a wing. Yet this does not mean that we
should or do take legal doctrine for “wizardry” as Robert Howse felt tempted to call
it. “Thou know’st we work by wit, and not by witchcraft” (Othello II 3). In this sense,
legal doctrine is simply an attempt to build a bridge between will and world by small
scholarly steps.
I frankly admit that this is a description of the ideal. Nevertheless, in a regulative
(asymptotic) sense and by and large, this ideal can work quite well I dare say. (Even
though facing the one or other failure I sometimes feel inclined myself to drown
the whole idea in black humor.) Hence I think one should not too easily part with or
underestimate the German tradition of legal doctrine. I also believe that the state
exam – twofold as the first is now, divided between state and universities – actually
provides a good frame for this concept of legal doctrine since it even institutionally
expresses the dialog between science and an administration linked to (state-)
practice.
The problem about legal doctrine however is its tendency to stay a monologue and
deal with its difficulties by merely talking to itself. But neither must nor need it be so,
for doctrine cannot provide all relevant answers from within itself.
The need for interdisciplinarity, internationalization and comparative legal studies
And this leads to my second step: the (two main) reasons why this doctrine has to
be amplified by other disciplines (be it philosophy, history, sociology, psychology,
political or economic science etc. – I leave theory aside for the moment since
one might argue that legal theory could be called “purely” legal although I would
say that as a meta-science at least it’s general structures are trans-legal) and
internationalization/ comparative legal studies. So the reasons are:
First the (necessary) narrowness of legal doctrine and second its need for
development.
Legal doctrine is not the ghost of a dead ancestor haunting the house of law – even
though it is often mistaken for being so. It is a living language that needs adaption to
its subjects. And these subjects have several dimensions that can be viewed from
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several disciplinary perspectives and on the whole (i.e. in their n-dimensionality) only
be seen by taking all of them into account. Other disciplines as well as other legal
systems with their different concepts of law can not only be mirrors for reflection but
may also provide solutions or at least important information for the solution of legal
problems. To understand its own perspective and to reflectedly decide its own focus,
legal scholarship needs the communication with other perspectives. The report of the
council refers to this quite broadly.
Yet – one has to be well aware of the fact that this is a dialogue of different
languages, which will always need translation (you absolutely do not have to be a
disciple of Luhmann to see it that way). And this brings me to my third step:
One of the main conditions for a successful dialogue
The main danger in this field lies in mixing or rather blurring methods. The
unreflected adoption of elements or reasoning from other disciplines or legal
systems without minding their specific function or logic or role in their actual theoretic
“environment” confuses legal reasoning as much as a reflected translation clears
and enriches it. In this sense, what makes legal doctrine narrow and stubborn
on the one hand could on the other hand be turned into an advantage: it actually
forces to translation – hence, I believe, the increasing inclination to drop it, because
translation taken seriously is quite demanding. Like in any ordinary translation one
hast to deal with at least four possibilities:
1. an element/aspect can easily be translated (since there are functional equivalents
or similar structures)
2. an element/aspect can be translated but only by slightly shifting/adapting its
meaning/function
3. an element/aspect cannot be translated directly but
a) one can create a new word/ make new use of a concept or
b) one can adopt the foreign word/ concept in one’s own language if the meaning is
needed or useful.
4. an element/aspect cannot be translated at all because in one’s own language (i.e.
in a legal perspective) there is/can be no equivalent to the relevant aspect.
All these possibilities have to be reflected and challenged in every particular case
before applying one of them.
Of course the translation-aspect is – although not always focused directly – always
present (in publications, in the report and in this blog, see for the latter e.g. Michaela
Haibronner’s carefully observing post). So on the one hand I am surely taking owls to
Athens (or coals to Newcastle – if anyone feels offended by the cultural dominance
of ancient Greek proverbs). Yet on the other hand one can still – not generally but
regularly – witness people at international and/or interdisciplinary conferences using
the same word for completely different concepts without being aware of it (the word/
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concept of “constitution” being one prominent example). Now this may decrease
with a scholar’s expertise in several disciplines and/or legal orders (as Ralf Michaels
suggested) – however, blurring of methods might not. On the contrary there are quite
some examples even of brilliant scholars that tend to use their second subject as
a magical answering tool for legal problems in the sense that the “actual” meaning
of law is supposed to be economic, philosophical, sociological or whatever. To a
certain extent, this is a necessary element of interdisciplinarity, but the limit lies
I think at a level where it starts to erode the specific logic of law. Law is deeply
linked to other matters but it is not driven by them – at least not as long as it is
conscious of its own possibilities. This also makes, that its link to other matters is
not a one way road but rather works also vice versa (see report p. 37: “As a result
legal scholarship has a corrective function vis-à-vis the market, politics, morality
and religion. Legal scholarship participates in a discourse on societal principles,
such as justice, freedom, human dignity, and solidarity. It is not the only institution to
engage with these topics, but it approaches these principles through the exceptional
nature of the law, which is a force to be obeyed and applicable to all.” – Whether
or not one would like to put a “Schranken-Schranke” to this (what sounds like an
absolute) superiority claim, yet the (mutually interactive) autonomy of law remains).
Moreover the interactions of law are at least as manifold as is its scope of (possible)
aims, so there will always be a multitude of languages to be faced. If we want
to avoid building a babel-tower we will always have to be carefully aware of the
need for translation – in the double sense that we need to communicate with other
perspectives and that we need to translate the conclusions from this communication
into the (specific) language of law.
These caveats considered, how can a successful dialogue be achieved?
In this aspect, I must confess, parts of the report (especially its section B I) read
slightly Hegelian, i.e. describe what legal scholarship actually “an sich” is and how
its very concept embraces interdisciplinarity (e.g. p. 38 “Legal scholarship offers […]”
pp – the German version is even a deal stronger: “hält […] beständig präsent” ibid.
p. 34). I would agree, this may be the pure reason of the German concept of legal
scholarship, but that does not mean that its reason is uno actu real. True, even a
deficient realization is after all still a realization. However this interdisciplinarity is
not yet real in a considerably sufficient sense at all (or rather, it very partly is but not
in general) and the crucial question is whether it is going to become so. And I am
not that much of a Hegelian as to believe in the self-fulfilling or rather self-enforcing
power of the concept itself.
Still, one has to be fair, the report also sees the gaps between desiderata and reality,
at least section B III (studying law) mirrors them by providing a branch of ideas
how to promote interdisciplinarity, internationalization and comparative studies. I
would not even see their role in the concept as subordinate to legal doctrine as Ralf
Michaels does, although I am afraid it will be in the course of realization (proving the
vows to foundational subjects once more to be mere lip service). Yet that need not
be so. Although I am still sceptical whether the proposed “integration” (p. 60)  into
the classical doctrinal classes will work (not that it could not, but it demands a deal)
some other ideas seem quite promising, among them a real and regular cooperation
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with other faculties (p. 62) and the strengthening of comparative approaches also
by visiting teachers from other legal systems (p. 63). These are no magical tools
of course, but with some wit they might have a considerable positive effect. Still
interdisciplinarity and internationalization will never be self-fulfilling. Especially
we will always have to keep aware of the need for translation. Seminars with two
teachers from different disciplines or legal orders might enhance this but will not do
so automatically. At best we achieve a real dialogue that opens up a scope of ideas
and enables us to reflectedly decide which of them we consider promising for our
purpose. Whether and to what extent other disciplines or legal orders think our ideas
apt or promising for their purpose is a decision they will have to make.
After all, it is a question of consciousness. Hence it could be achieved. The future
has to prove whether it will be.
Anyway, if we understand the report in a Hegelian sense, we are sure to face an
enlightened future. – Yet “wit depends on dilatory time”. (Othello II 3)
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